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Anderson: Confidential Sources Reconsidered

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES RECONSIDERED
David A. Anderson*
ABSTRACT
For fifty years, the courts have debated whether the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press requires that journalists
be allowed to protect confidential sources. Many state and federal
courts have answered in the affirmative, creating a First Amendment
“reporter’s privilege.” The Supreme Court has declined to recognize
such a privilege, but has not foreclosed the possibility. This Article
suggests that the constitutional guarantee can be honored without
prescribing a constitutionally defined privilege. Whether freedom of the
press requires protection of confidential sources is one question; what
means should be chosen to protect them is another. Courts should
separate the two questions, deciding the first as a matter of
constitutional law while leaving the choice of means largely to
legislatures and common law resolution. Concerns about the scope and
administration of a First Amendment privilege have deflected attention
away from the underlying issue: whether compelled disclosure of
sources abridges freedom of the press.
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I. ZEAL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
Constitutional law does not have to solve every problem it identifies.
Sometimes it is enough to tell the state that what it has done is
unconstitutional, explain why, and invalidate the action, leaving the
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state to decide what to do about correcting the problem. In many
instances, courts recognize this. When they hold a statute
unconstitutional, they usually do not tell the legislature what it must do
to make the measure constitutional. They invalidate the judgment that
rests on statute and point out its constitutional flaw, but leave the state
free to decide whether to amend the statute, repeal it, ignore it, or
reinterpret it. Although their description of the problem often indicates
what the appropriate repair would be, courts normally do not try to fix
whatever infirmity in state law or practice led to the constitutional
violation.
When a First Amendment violation is found, however, courts—
particularly, the Supreme Court—seem to feel obliged to provide a
solution. The most obvious example is the constitutional law of
defamation. When the Supreme Court believes a libel judgment offends
the First Amendment, it does not just reverse the judgment; it prescribes
a constitutional rule that specifies what the state must do to make its
defamation judgments enforceable. Thus, when the Court became
convinced that libel recoveries by public officials threatened to chill
robust discussion of public issues, it prescribed a test—the actual malice
test—that courts must apply to permit such recoveries.1 Later, the Court
added many other substantive and procedural rules—all of
constitutional dimension—that states must observe in administering
their defamation law: public figures must meet the same constitutional
requirements as public officials;2 private plaintiffs who do not meet
those requirements must at least show negligence, and the damages
available to them are limited;3 actual malice must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence,4 and appellate courts must subject that finding
to independent judicial review rather than the usual clearly erroneous
standard;5 states must assign defamation plaintiffs the burden of proving
falsity, rather than treating truth as a defense as the common law treated
it;6 and states cannot permit recovery for defamation accomplished
through hyperbole, satire, or similar nonfactual assertions.7 All of these
rules trump state law. As a result of almost thirty Supreme Court
decisions applying constitutional rules in defamation cases,8 and some
1. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
2. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155–56 (1967).
3. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348–50 (1974) (holding that private
plaintiffs defamed in discussions about matters of public concern need not show actual malice,
but must show some level of fault, and may not recover presumed or punitive damages unless
they show actual malice).
4. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989).
5. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–11, 514 (1984).
6. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
7. See Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14–15 (1970).
8. For a listing of the twenty-eight libel cases decided by the Supreme Court through
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lower court decisions creating constitutional rules that go beyond
anything required by the Supreme Court,9 constitutional law plays at
least as large a role in the resolution of most libel cases as the common
law or state statutory law.
In other media law branches of First Amendment law, courts
generally have not created solutions as elaborate as those in defamation,
but they apparently do feel compelled to provide solutions. The most
broadly applicable solution is one that requires courts to apply a form of
strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on truthful speech about
matters of public concern. This solution began with a very general
principle that apparently was to be applied to cases ad hoc. In its first
application, the Court merely determined that the state interests
advanced by a particular restriction “are insufficient to justify the actual
and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press
which follow therefrom.”10 This evolved, however, into a “test,” or at
least an analytical prescription. The first statement of the test was just a
single sentence, albeit one loaded with pregnant phrases: “[I]f a
newspaper [1] lawfully obtains [2] truthful information [3] about a
matter of public significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent [4] a need
to further [5] a state interest of the highest order.”11 Predictably, each of
the key phrases developed its own jurisprudence, particularly (1) and
(4). More speech turned out to be “lawfully obtained” than might have
been expected; even information obtained by illegal eavesdropping can
be treated as “lawfully obtained” in the hands of a third party.12 The
“need” requirement came to mean that a restriction cannot suppress
more speech than necessary, or at least must be a narrowly tailored
means of achieving the state’s high-order goal,13 and little deference is
given to the state’s determination as to what is necessary.14
1991, see David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 488
nn.1–2 (1991). The Court’s only libel decision since then is Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734,
736–39 (2005), holding that an injunction against future defamatory statements violated the
First Amendment.
9. See, e.g., Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977)
(concluding that the First Amendment requires recognition of a neutral reportage privilege,
which protects some speech that is published with actual malice); Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co.,
518 F.2d 638, 639 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that habitual criminal is “libel-proof,” i.e., cannot
recover anything other than nominal damages even if he can meet all the other requirements
imposed by the First Amendment).
10. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978).
11. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
12. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525, 535 (2001).
13. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812–13 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537–41 (rejecting explanations for state’s
decision to prohibit disclosure of rape victims’ names by mass media without also prohibiting
disclosure by word of mouth).
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In some types of cases, the Supreme Court prescribes lists of factors
lower courts must consider in deciding whether to restrict speech. For
example, a judge contemplating restricting press coverage in the interest
of protecting a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial must consider:
“(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other
measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial
publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to
prevent the threatened danger.”15 This is not just advice to the judge;
she must make a record that satisfies the appellate courts that her
conclusions on these matters are justified.16 Similarly, a judge
contemplating closing the courtroom to protect an accused’s right to a
fair trial must first determine whether the proceeding is one that
traditionally has been open or is of a sort that benefits from public
exposure.17 If at least one of those conditions is met, the judge must
demonstrate that “first, there is a substantial probability that the
defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that
closure would prevent, and second, reasonable alternatives to closure
cannot adequately protect the defendant’s fair trial rights.”18
The Court does not always feel compelled to prescribe remedies for
First Amendment problems, however. For example, the Court famously
invalidated injunctions against publication of the Pentagon Papers
without specifying what the government would have to do to make such
prior restraints enforceable.19 Several Justices wrote separate opinions
suggesting what the government would have to show to win their vote
to affirm such an injunction,20 but the Court’s holding was only that the
government had failed to carry the heavy burden necessary to overcome
the presumption that such restraints are unconstitutional.21 Interestingly,
that precedent has proved to be no less durable, and no less effective in
15. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
16. Id. at 568–69.
17. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986).
18. Id. at 14.
19. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
20. The vote was 6 to 3. Justice Douglas argued that prior restraints on publication are
never permissible. Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Black argued that the injunctions
at issue were so clearly unconstitutional that the Court should have vacated them without
hearing argument. Id. at 714 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, Justice Stewart, and
Justice White argued that the executive had no power to ask the courts to enjoin publication in
the absence of statutory authorization. Id. at 728–30 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 732 (White,
J., concurring); id. at 746–47 (Marshall, J., concurring). Only Justice Brennan offered anything
resembling a test to be applied to applications for prior restraints, stating: “only governmental
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the
occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support
even the issuance of an interim restraining order.” Id. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 714 (majority opinion). This brief per curiam opinion was the only one agreed to
by a majority of the Justices.
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protecting free speech, than others in which the Court provided
extensive prescriptions of constitutional requisites. In almost forty years
since the Pentagon Papers case, only a handful of prior restraints have
survived appellate review; many others have been invalidated on the
strength of its result, not because of any constitutional rules established
by that case.22
The practice of creating expansive solutions seems to have
originated with the Court itself.23 Herbert Wechsler, arguing for the
newspaper in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, did not propose the
actual malice rule.24 He asked the Court to reverse the judgment on the
broad ground that allowing public officials to claim they were
personally defamed by criticism of their official conduct would revive
the discredited notion of seditious libel, or on the narrow ground that
the plaintiff had not suffered any injury sufficient to justify the
“monstrous” judgment of $500,000 that the Alabama courts had
upheld.25 It was Justice Brennan who initiated the project of using the
case to construct a widely applicable constitutional regime to protect
speech and press from the chilling effect of the common law of
defamation.26 His opinion for the Court borrowed the actual malice test
from a remote state law precedent,27 strengthened it, and married it to
the idea of aggressive judicial review28—all without urging from the
lawyers. Justice Brennan’s boldness in prescribing a solution much
broader than necessary to decide the case, and his success in persuading
22. “[T]he Supreme Court has never upheld a prior restraint, even faced with the
competing interest of national security or the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996). “Even where questions of
allegedly urgent national security, or competing constitutional interests, are concerned, we have
imposed this ‘most extraordinary remed[y]’ only where the evil that would result from the
reportage is both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive measures.” CBS,
Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Presumably the
exceptions Justice Blackmun had in mind included prepublication obligations. See Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 609 (1980) (upholding injunction against disclosures by former
CIA agent). In the lower courts, the only prior restraint in the national security area that has
survived appellate review was the injunction approved in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467
F. Supp. 990, 991 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining publication of details of the hydrogen bomb).
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. Id. at 262–63; see also ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 120 (First Vintage Books ed. 1992).
25. See LEWIS, supra note 24, at 117–22 (describing Herbert Wechsler’s arguments).
26. For an account of Justice Brennan’s role, reconstructed from his detailed and
voluminous official papers, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS
SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 531–41 (1983).
27. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 285 (Kan. 1908) (expanding a common law
privilege to cover criticism of public officials).
28. “[C]onsiderations of effective judicial administration require us to review the
evidence in the present record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a judgment
for respondent.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284–85.
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the other Justices to go along, created a model that made First
Amendment litigation a far more rewarding enterprise than it would be
if courts merely invalidated judgments they found unconstitutional.
Once the Supreme Court revealed its willingness to adopt sweeping
solutions to First Amendment problems, the dynamics of advocacy took
over and made this model the norm. Media lawyers represent clients
who are likely to be repeat players in First Amendment cases. If they
can persuade courts not to merely resolve the case at hand, but adopt
constitutional rules that will apply to many other cases, they do their
clients a great service. A consequence not mentioned in the opinions,
but obvious to lawyers and judges alike, was that adopting
constitutional rules effectively nationalized areas of law that otherwise
would be frustratingly local. To media outlets that operate nationally or
at least in multiple states, this uniformity itself is often the biggest
benefit, and because most outlets are at least multi-state, lack of
uniformity is itself a threat to freedom of the press. Lawyers for
different media outlets often collaborate in formulating and advancing
expansive principles that could have broad applicability. By
establishing a constitutional rule that would benefit all media, a lawyer
could win the applause not only of her client but of the wider media law
fraternity. If there was any constituency for a more modest
constitutional response, it had little chance of being heard.
The resulting zeal for far-reaching constitutional solutions has
infected the controversy over protecting the confidentiality of
journalists’ sources. The basic question—when, if ever, freedom of the
press is violated by compelling a journalist to reveal her source—has
become complicated if not obfuscated by questions as to what should be
the constitutional rules governing such cases. This Article aims to
disentangle those questions, suggesting a way to prevent
unconstitutional intrusions on the confidentiality of sources without
involving courts in a morass of constitutional lawmaking. The heart of
the suggestion is that courts can prevent enforcement of subpoenas that
would infringe freedom of the press without attempting to design a
comprehensive regime for regulating the subject. The latter is better left
to legislatures and common law courts, but that does not require courts
to ignore unconstitutional infringements.
II. WHY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES NEED PROTECTION
Courts and legislatures have been debating whether journalists
should be compelled to disclose confidential news sources for at least
fifty years.29 Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have passed
29. Legislation was introduced in Congress as early as 1959. See S. 965, 86th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1959); H.R. 355, 86th Cong. (1st Sess. 1959). A journalist advanced a First Amendment
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shield statutes,30 and Congress may be poised to enact one at the federal
level.31 Some state courts find in their state constitutions a guaranteed
right to keep confidences,32 and many federal courts find such a right in
the First Amendment33 or federal common law.34 This patchwork of
statutes and judicial precedents makes instances in which journalists are
actually compelled to disclose confidential sources remarkably few, and
we see plenty of reporting that relies on confidential sources. It would
be a huge mistake, however, to believe this state of affairs would
continue if there were no constitutional right to protect sources. The
constitutional claim that freedom of the press would be compromised if
journalists had no right to keep confidences is not mooted by the
existence of shield statutes. For one thing, the statutes provide varying
degrees of protection, and when the relevant statute fails to protect a
journalist, a First Amendment privilege may do so.35 More importantly,
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press is a potent
background force in the statutory scheme. Legislatures often pass shield
statutes in response to arguments that the Constitution requires them, or
at least that they serve constitutional values. Similar arguments
sometimes influence interpretation of the statutes—for example,
inducing courts to interpret statutes expansively to avoid constitutional
issues that might otherwise arise. The pervasive presence of
constitutional arguments in confidential source controversies is largely
the result of uncertainty. The Supreme Court has spoken to the issue
claim of privilege as early as 1958. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547–48 (2d Cir. 1958).
Even before that, there were numerous controversies over protecting confidential sources, and a
number of states had enacted shield statutes, one as early as 1896. See JOHN J. WATKINS, THE
MASS MEDIA AND THE LAW 299–302 (1990).
30. The Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press maintains a compendium of all
the shield statutes, which is available at http://www.rcfp.org/privilege (last visited June 29,
2009). This list shows thirty-four shield statutes. It does not include the Texas Free Flow of
Information Act; 81st Leg., R.S., H.B. 670, effective May 13, 2009. Two other states recognize
a privilege by court rule. Utah R. Evid. 509, West’s Utah Code Ann. (2009); N.M. Evid. Rules
11-514 (West’s N.M. Stat. Ann. 2009).
31. At this writing, the proposed Free Flow of Information Act has been passed by the
House of Representatives and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See H.R. 985, 111th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), 155 CONG. REC. H4204-09 (2009).
32. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; O’Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 279–
80 (N.Y. 1988) (recognizing qualified privilege under state constitution and First Amendment).
33. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc.
v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630
F.2d 139, 146–47 (3d Cir. 1980).
34. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing a
privilege as a matter of non-statutory federal law); see also Senear v. Daily Journal-American,
641 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Wash. 1982) (recognizing privilege as matter of state common law).
35. See, e.g., Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1342–44 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that
Alabama’s statutory privilege did not cover magazine journalist, but First Amendment privilege
did).
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only once,36 and what it said was ambiguous enough to let lower courts
create such protections as they thought necessary,37 and at the same
time, to encourage legislatures to pass shield statutes. If the Court were
to definitively hold that compelled disclosure of confidential sources
raises no constitutional concerns, that background influence on courts
and legislatures would vanish, and news reporting that relies on
confidential sources would diminish—for better and worse.
If permitting journalists to maintain confidentiality of sources is not
essential to freedom of the press, there is, of course, no need to consider
what constitutional principles courts should apply in cases seeking to
compel disclosure. I doubt freedom of the press requires as much
protection as many journalists claim. For example, I do not find
persuasive the argument that journalists should have a constitutional
right to resist subpoenas for even non-confidential materials, such as
outtakes and originals of published photos. Producing such materials
may be inconvenient, burdensome, or even threatening to journalistic
values, but non-constitutional remedies—shield statutes, protective
orders, and motions to quash—can adequately address those concerns.
Some confidential source cases, however, raise concerns of a far higher
order. In a few instances, protection of confidential sources may be the
only way to maintain democratic accountability.
A. Government Secrecy
Experiences of the past decade demonstrate the inextricable
connections between government secrecy policies and the need for
news reporting based on confidential sources. Unauthorized disclosures
by anonymous sources—leaks—are the bane of any government
determined to control information. At the same time, leaks are an
indispensable antidote to the tendency of governments to be unduly
secretive. These truisms are in perpetual competition; government does
its best to keep secrets, and dissidents, gossips, whistleblowers,
troublemakers, and patriots—with the press as their indispensable
ally—do their best to expose them. Subpoenas seeking to discover the
sources of leaks are an important tool in any government’s informationcontrol program.
Of course, not all subpoenas are directed at leaks of government
information; many are obtained by lawyers seeking to compel
journalists to supply evidence in civil litigation or criminal
prosecutions, for example. But suppression of government leaks has
36. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689–90, 697, 699 (1972).
37. One source lists decisions recognizing a reporter’s privilege in all but two of the
federal courts of appeals. See James C. Goodale, et al., Reporter’s Privilege, in 3 COMM. LAW
373, 382 n.2 (Practising Law Institute, 2004). The same source asserts that “state courts have
also generally found that the First Amendment provides a qualified privilege.” Id. at 382.
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never been far from the surface in the controversies over press
subpoenas. After a few scattered instances in the first 150 years of the
Republic, press subpoenas suddenly multiplied when the Nixon
Administration became incensed about leaks to the press. Under
Attorney General John Mitchell, the government procured scores of
subpoenas. More than fifty were served on CBS and NBC, networks
that had particularly angered the administration.38 The example set by
the Justice Department inspired local prosecutors and defense lawyers
to also seek journalists’ evidence, and soon subpoenas rained down on
the press in unprecedented numbers.39 That eruption led to the Supreme
Court’s only decision on journalists’ claims that compelling them to
disclose confidential sources violates the Constitution.40
That case, Branzburg v. Hayes,41 decided in 1972, arose from three
garden-variety criminal prosecutions. In each case, a prosecutor
subpoenaed a journalist to testify before a grand jury investigating
suspected criminal activities.42 The journalists argued that compulsory
disclosure of confidences would deter sources from talking to reporters,
thereby abridging freedom of the press by hampering news gathering.43
They urged the Court to adopt, as a matter of constitutional law, a
“reporter’s privilege” that would prevent a journalist from being forced
to appear at a proceeding or testify unless the party seeking the
testimony could show grounds to believe that: (1) the reporter has
information relevant to the investigation of a crime, (2) the information
is unavailable from other sources, and (3) the need for the information
is sufficiently compelling to override the invasion of First Amendment
interests that would result from compelling disclosure.44 Deciding the
three cases together, the Court rejected the journalists’ claims that they
had a constitutional right to protect the confidentiality of their sources,
but did not foreclose the possibility that in different circumstances the
Constitution might limit the use of subpoenas against the press.45
38. See Douglas McCollam, Attack at the Source: Why the Plame Case is so Scary,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 29, 36.
39. See Fred P. Graham, Background Paper, in PRESS FREEDOMS UNDER PRESSURE:
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESS
53, 55, 64 (1972) (reporting that in the first two and one-half years of the Nixon Administration,
NBC and CBS and their wholly owned stations received 124 subpoenas obtained by federal and
state prosecutors and defense counsel, and during the same period, thirty subpoenas were served
on the Chicago newspapers published by Field Enterprises, Inc.).
40. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
41. Id. at 667–79 (including companion cases United States v. Caldwell (No. 70-94) and
In re Pappas (No. 70-57)).
42. Id. at 668–69, 672–73, 676.
43. Id. at 679–80.
44. Id. at 680, 698.
45. Id. at 707–09.
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In the years since that decision, it has become clear that Branzburg
did not present the case for constitutional protection of confidential
sources in its strongest light, for two reasons not fully recognized at the
time. First, Branzburg presented the subpoena controversy in an
ordinary criminal context rather than in the context of the leaksuppression campaign that had motivated the Justice Department.46
Governmental hostility might have been at work: one news report in
question concerned widespread use of marijuana in the community and
the other two involved the Black Panthers, a radical group that inspired
a great deal of law enforcement angst at the time.47 But none of the
reports involved threats to governmental information control policies,
so the role of confidential sources in combating government secrecy
was not implicated. Although the journalists tried to make that
connection, the cases themselves did not put that squarely before the
Court. Second, the specifics of a constitutional reporters’ privilege that
the journalists asked the Court to create diverted the Court’s attention
from the fundamental question—does compelled disclosure of
confidential sources threaten freedom of the press? As a result, the
Court did not decide that question. Instead, Justice White’s majority
opinion devoted most of its attention to worries about how the privilege
would work: Who would be allowed to claim the privilege? How
effective would it be in easing the fears of potential informants? How
would courts determine whether the prerequisites for invoking the
privilege had been met? How would courts balance the need for
disclosure against the interests in confidentiality?48 Justice White
expressed skepticism toward the claim that freedom of the press
required protection for confidential sources, but the decision seemed to
be based less on doubt about that than on concern about the operation of
the proposed privilege.49
A series of meliorations averted a major showdown over
confidential sources for following thirty years. The Justice Department
adopted guidelines that restricted federal prosecutors’ use of
subpoenas.50 Moreover, in addition to the seventeen states that had
shield statutes when the Court decided Branzburg, eighteen more states
adopted them, sometimes offering broader protection than the First

46. Id. at 667, 672, 675.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 703–06.
49. Id. at 698–99.
50. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2008). For discussion of the history and effectiveness of the
guidelines, see Grant Penrod, A Problem of Interpretation: DOJ Guidelines for Subpoenaing
Reporters are Useful, but No Substitute for a Federal Shield Law, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW,
Fall 2004, at 4, 4–6.
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Amendment privilege the Court declined to create in Branzburg.51 Most
importantly, most federal courts and a considerable number of state
courts recognized some sort of First Amendment privilege.52 Those
courts generally dealt with Branzburg by limiting it to its setting—
reporters refusing to testify before grand juries—and adopted, for other
types of proceedings such as criminal and civil trials, a privilege like the
one rejected in Branzburg.53
B. Protection of Confidential Sources is Diminishing
Hundreds of subpoena controversies were litigated during this
period, some under the shield statutes and some under the First
Amendment.54 Because Branzburg did not rule out First Amendment
protection and encouraged passage of statutes, journalists in most
instances continued to believe they had a right to keep their sources
confidential, so they continued to promise confidentiality and usually
resisted when confronted with a subpoena.55 Parties contemplating such
a subpoena usually realized that the journalist most likely had colorable
grounds, under a statute or the First Amendment (or both), for a
protracted and costly contest, and this realization undoubtedly
prevented a great many subpoenas from ever being issued.

51. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West
2009). Both statutes create a privilege that cannot be defeated by showing a compelling need for
disclosure of the source. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21
(West 2009). In California, the language recognizing the privilege has been added to the state
constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
52. See supra note 37.
53. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Corp., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st
Cir. 1980) (holding that Branzburg did not foreclose recognizing privilege in civil case); United
States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing privilege in criminal case
despite Branzburg).
The rationale for recognizing a privilege in trials but denying one in grand juries is not
readily apparent. It is true that the Court in Branzburg emphasized that the grand jury plays an
important role in fair and effective law enforcement and historically enjoys broad powers. See
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665, 686–88 (1972). But one might suppose that the dangers of compelled
disclosure might also be higher in grand juries, where the subpoenaed reporter usually will not
have the benefit of counsel present in the room, and the secrecy of the proceedings conceals
what transpires from the source and the public.
54. Goodale, et. al., supra note 37 (containing 472 pages of concise summaries of cases in
which reporters litigated subpoenas).
55. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) lists nineteen reporters
who were jailed for refusing to comply with subpoenas and twenty who were fined. See RCFP,
Paying the Price, A Recent Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify,
http://www.rcfp.org/jail.html (last visited June 29, 2009). Many others, of course, resisted
subpoenas and were not held in contempt. Id.; see Goodale, et al, supra note 37 (summarizing
cases which indicate that most reporters resisted their subpoenas successfully).
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This uneasy accommodation has now come unraveled through a
confluence of separate events. One was an influential opinion by Judge
Posner, who said some of the decisions in other circuits “essentially
ignore Branzburg,” or “audaciously declare that Branzburg actually
created a reporter’s privilege.”56 Over the years, media lawyers
cultivated the idea that a majority of the Justices in Branzburg had
actually endorsed a First Amendment privilege, and numerous courts
embraced that idea. The theory arose from Justice Powell’s opinion in
Branzburg, in which he seemed to share the dissenters’ view that the
First Amendment requires some protection for journalists’ use of
confidential sources.57 The argument was that the four dissenters plus
Justice Powell should be treated as the majority in Branzburg.58 But as
Judge Posner pointed out, this fiction could be sustained only by
ignoring the fact that Justice Powell concurred fully in the majority
opinion, not just in the judgment.59 Judge Posner not only refuted the
theory, he scolded judges who accepted it.60 Posner’s criticisms left
journalists without a convincing claim of Supreme Court support for
their theory that the First Amendment protects their right to keep
confidences.
Another unraveling event was the subpoena controversy that arose
over the outing of CIA agent Valerie Plame.61 After Plame’s husband
published an op-ed article casting doubt on one of President George W.
Bush’s justifications for the invasion of Iraq, someone leaked to several
journalists Plame’s name and affiliation.62 A special prosecutor issued
subpoenas to force the reporters to reveal who gave them the
information.63 When the courts rejected the reporters’ claims of
privilege, one of the journalists, Judith Miller of the New York Times,
went to jail for eighty-five days for refusing to disclose her source.64
The other, Matt Cooper of Time, kept the confidence and was also held
in contempt, but his employer capitulated and named the source.65
Miller eventually won release by naming her source, explaining that the
source had released her from her pledge of confidentiality.66 The
56. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003).
57. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 727–30 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
58. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 531–32.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 532.
61. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
62. Id. at 1143.
63. Id. at 1143–44.
64. David Johnston, Leak Revelation Leaves Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at A1.
65. Bill Saporito, When to Give Up a Source, TIME, July 11, 2005, at 34, 34.
66. David Johnston, Rove Ordered to Talk Again in Leak Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2005, at A1.
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extensive publicity that accompanied the Plame controversy exposed a
seamy web of relationships between Washington reporters and highlevel government sources, and made it clear that no noble purpose had
been served by journalists’ reliance on confidential sources in that case.
The episode was not likely to convince anyone that confidential sources
play a critical role in democracy.67
The Plame case did make clear, however, that there is an inescapable
connection between leaks and government secrecy policies. The
controversy arose during “a draconian clampdown on the free flow of
government information to the public,”68 which greatly increased the
press’ dependence on leaks for information about important public
issues. The Bush Administration closed many channels of authorized
disclosure.69 It reversed the policy of previous administrations that
information should be presumed disclosable under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), replaced that policy with an instruction to
agencies to carefully consider all possibly applicable exemptions before
granting FOIA requests, and pledged to defend agency decisions to
withhold information.70 The White House instructed agencies to
67. Lost in the debris of the Plame affair was an important lesson. Had the district court
accorded the journalists a privilege of even the weakest sort, a great deal of pain and expense
could have been avoided. It eventually became clear that by the time the special prosecutor
subpoenaed the journalists, he already knew that the initial source of the leak was Richard
Armitage, a former deputy Secretary of State. See David Johnston, Leak Revelation Leaves
Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at A1 (reporting that Armitage first told authorities he
was the source of the leak two months before the prosecutor began his investigation). If the
court had entertained the possibility that a qualified privilege applied, the prosecutor would have
been required to show that the information sought from the reporters was not available from
other sources—a showing he would have been unable to make. Further, if the reason Armitage
was never charged was that no crime was committed, the subpoenas should have been quashed
on the additional ground that there was no evidence that the journalists’ information was
relevant to the investigation of a crime. As is true in many subpoena controversies, the case for
compelling disclosure looked far stronger at the outset than it did once some rudimentary facts
became known. But if there is no basis for a claim of privilege, there is no mechanism for
eliciting those facts.
68. Clint Hendler, What We Didn’t Know Has Hurt Us, COLUM. JOURNALISM. REV., Jan.–
Feb. 2009, at 28, 28.
69. See Reeling from Hurricane “W”, THE NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Fall 2008, at 4, 4.
70. The Department of Justice, under John Ashcroft, instructed heads of federal
departments and agencies that
[a]ny discretionary decision by your agency to disclose information protected
under the FOIA should be made only after full and deliberate consideration of
the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy interests that could be
implicated by disclosure of the information. . . . When you carefully consider
FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, you can be
assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they
lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the
ability of other agencies to protect other important records.
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withhold “information that could be misused to harm the security of our
nation or threaten public safety” even if the material was not within the
national security exception to the FOIA and was not classified.71 At the
behest of the Administration, Congress created a large new exemption to
the FOIA, making it a crime for a federal employee to disclose
information voluntarily supplied to a federal agency if the entity
supplying it has designated it “critical infrastructure information,”72 and
at least one federal employee was sentenced to prison for giving
“sensitive but unclassified” information to a reporter.73 In addition,
President Bush issued an executive order allowing the sitting president to
prevent the release of papers of the previous presidents and giving all past
presidents and vice presidents power to prevent release of their papers.74
The number of documents classified annually increased greatly,75 and
federal employees were forbidden to disclose even some non-classified
documents.76 The Bush Administration warned officials that it would
not tolerate unauthorized disclosures, and employees were asked to sign
waivers of any confidentiality agreements they had made, or might
make in the future, with reporters.77 By the time of the Plame
Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft on The Freedom of Information Act to Heads
of all Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/oip/foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm (last visited June 29, 2009).
71. Memorandum from Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, Jr.
on Action to Safeguard Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other
Sensitive Documents Related to Homeland Security to Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost
10.htm (last visited June 29, 2009) (forwarding memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly,
Acting Director of Information Security Oversight Office, Richard L. Huff and Daniel J.
Metcalfe, Co-Directors of Office of Information Privacy within the Department of Justice).
72. 6 U.S.C. § 133 (2006). Critics said this provision was used by agencies and businesses to
conceal matters that had more to do with environmental and public safety issues than with
terrorism risks. See Trudy Lieberman, Homeland Security: What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us:
Imagining Evil, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 24, 29–30.
73. See Lori Robertson, In Control, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb.–Mar. 2005, at 26, 31.
74. See Hendler, supra note 68, at 29. This power was extended not only to past
presidents and vice presidents during their lifetimes but also to their heirs. Id.
75. See Rebecca Carr, Open Government in America: Rise in Secrecy Guards No One,
Critics Say, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Mar. 14, 2005, at A1. The increase was almost 78% from
2001 to 2004. Id.
76. See John Files, Security Dept. Eases Its Nondisclosure Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2005, at A17 (reporting that the Department of Homeland Security was revising a six-month-old
policy of requiring employees to sign pledges not to disclose “sensitive but unclassified”
information, and replacing that policy with a program of training employees to avoid such
disclosures).
77. See Douglas McCollam, Why the Plame Case Is So Scary: Attack at the Source,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 29, 32, 34 (reporting two instances in which
hundreds of government employees were asked to sign such waivers); Adam Liptak, Reporters
Face Scrutiny in C.I.A. Leak Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at A18 (reporting that Special
Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald required White House officials to sign confidentiality waivers).
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controversy, the Bush Administration’s control of information could not
be ignored. 78
Tighter information-control policies make unauthorized leaks more
important to both the government and the press.79 From the government’s
point of view, information-control policies will be ineffective if the
government cannot control unauthorized disclosures. From the press
point of view, when government shuts down authorized avenues of
disclosure, leaks become the only source of information. From sources’
point of view, when the government increases the peril of leaking,
confidentiality becomes even more important to the leakers. It is an
escalation that has no natural end as long as the two sides adhere to
conflicting views of their responsibilities. Leaks are not always inimical
to government information control. The leak of Plame’s identity, for
example, appeared to be an instrument of the government’s information
policies; it was an instance of high-level officials clandestinely
dispensing information that the government wanted known but was not
willing to disclose openly. Many statements attributed to confidential
sources fit that description; some journalists say that is the most common
use of confidential sources in Washington.80 But leaks also come from
whistleblowers, dissenters, and malcontents who are willing to tell what
78. Some of the Bush secrecy policies have already been reversed. For example, one of
President Barack Obama’s earliest acts was to reinstate the presumption in favor of disclosure in
FOIA requests. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Freedom of Information Act to
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Freedom_of_Information_Act/ (last visited June
29, 2009). But White House control over information has been tightening for at least a quarter
century, and will no doubt continue. As Lori Robertson explains:
An emphasis on tighter news management has been building as each successive
administration learns from the previous one. A rigid approach to staying on
message and a clampdown on access for reporters and the public have been
increasingly used by the executive branch, a trend that began to take shape
during the Reagan administration, if not earlier. The current Bush
administration has shown that the method can be perfected, with little to no
downside for the White House.
Robertson, supra note 73, at 28.
79. One of the many ironies of the Miller and Cooper cases was that the subpoenas in these
cases disserved the government’s interests in secrecy. Once the special prosecutor was appointed,
the cases took on a life of their own, exposing secrets the White House could not have been happy
to see exposed. Had President Bush known the leakers would turn out to be his own people, he no
doubt would have preferred to handle the matter internally rather than through a highly publicized
legal proceeding.
80. Cf. Lorne Manly, Big News Media Join in Push to Limit Use of Unidentified Sources,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2005, at C1 (reporting that USA Today, The Washington Post, The Los
Angeles Times, NBC News, and the New York Times were taking steps to curtail use of
anonymous sources in response to criticism from the White House and others).
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they know on condition of anonymity, and these are the principal
resources available to the press and public in their perpetual struggle
against government secrecy. This does not justify all journalistic uses of
confidential sources, nor does it suggest that all should be legally
protected, but it does indicate that some of them are important
instruments in democratic accountability.
In Branzburg, the Court doubted that requiring reporters to disclose
their sources to grand juries would “undermine the freedom of the press
to collect and disseminate news.”81 Since then, the Court in other
contexts has developed more sensitivity to the realities under which the
press receives information.82 The past decade has made it clearer than
ever that freedom of the press requires some protection for confidential
sources.83 If there is a case to be made to the contrary, it would be that
the need for governmental secrecy is paramount. The ability to compel
reporters to identify leakers is a crucial enforcement device to a
government that believes secrecy is necessary or at least desirable. If
other liberties must be compromised in the interest of combating terror,
perhaps we must also be prepared to forego freedom of the press insofar
as that includes the ability to rely on confidential sources. But the
argument that full freedom of the press is a luxury we can no longer
afford is a very different argument from the claim that compelling
disclosure of sources does not seriously threaten freedom of the press.84
81. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698 (1972).
82. For example, the Court has held that the press cannot be punished for, or even made to
pay for, injuries resulting from its disclosure of information furnished to it illegally. See Fla.
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527–29, 541 (1989) (holding that state may not award damages to
rape victim named as a result of sheriff’s unlawful disclosure of victim’s name). Wiretap
statutes making it a crime to disclose information that the defendant knows was obtained
through an illegal interception cannot be enforced against parties not involved in the actual
interception, at least when the information is about matters of public concern. See Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18, 535 (2001). Because this principle speaks only to publication,
not the withholding of information, it is not directly applicable to disclosure of confidential
sources. But the privacy case described above protects the press’ right to use information
illegally furnished to it, and the wiretap case protects its use of information illegally obtained by
its source. The Court’s decision in both cases to treat illegally obtained information as being
“lawfully acquired” by the press is at least tacit recognition that acquisition of information
cannot be lightly excluded from constitutional protection.
83. A survey of news organizations counted 823 subpoenas directed at news organizations
in 2001. See Samantha Fredrickson, A Reporter’s Privilege in Tatters, THE NEWS MEDIA & THE
LAW, Fall 2008, at 15, 17. A similar survey counted 3,062 in 2006. Id.
84. In Branzburg, the Court characterized the reporters’ proposal generically as a “First
Amendment reporter’s privilege,” and did not identify the Press Clause specifically as the basis of
the claim. 408 U.S. at 698–700. It is difficult to argue with a straight face, however, that the claim
does not rest squarely on the Press Clause. If it rested on the Speech Clause, all speakers—which is
to say everyone—presumably could claim a right to refuse to disclose confidential sources. That
would decimate the fact-finding process, so that a privilege based on the Speech Clause would
have to be limited to a subset of speakers. The subset was identified by the claimants in Branzburg
(and is identified in the many lower court cases recognizing a privilege) as “reporters.” Id. at 695,
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Recognition that it does threaten freedom of the press is widespread
today.85 At the same time, events of the past decade have diminished the
likelihood that journalists will be allowed to maintain confidences.
Although shield statutes are still in place, the tenuous but widespread
consensus that reporters have a constitutional right to protect their
sources has all but vanished.
III. OBJECTIONS TO A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
The constitutional response advocated by the press is recognition of
a journalists’ privilege under the First Amendment, one of the sort
rejected by the Court in Branzburg but subsequently adopted by many
lower courts. This privilege would take the form of a constitutional rule,
usually articulated along the following lines: “disclosure may be
ordered only upon a clear and specific showing that the information is:
highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of
the claim, and not obtainable from other available sources.”86
Such a rule does not begin to answer the many questions it raises:
Who qualifies as a journalist for purposes of the privilege? Does it
apply only to the identity of confidential sources, or also to information
given in confidence by sources whose identity is known? Does it apply
to non-confidential information? Can the privilege be waived by the
source? Does it permit a judge to order a journalist to disclose to the
judge in-camera so the judge can determine whether the information is
critical to the claim? Who has the burden of showing that the
information is or is not available from other sources? Such questions
can be answered on a case-by-case basis, but the resulting elaboration of
the privilege makes it look less like a constitutional rule than a statute—
which suggests that perhaps the matter is better suited for statutory
resolution in the first place.
703–05. There have been a few cases extending the privilege to scholars and other nonjournalists, but it is identified almost universally as a “reporter’s privilege” and a number of
courts have refused to extend it to claimants not employed by news organizations. See, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 29 Med. L. Rptr. 2301, 2304 n.4 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(unpublished opinion), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1011 (2002). Identifying it as a “reporter’s
privilege” rather than a “press privilege” may be a tactically useful way of pretending that the
beneficiaries are individuals rather than powerful organizations, but it is not an honest way of
avoiding reliance on the Press Clause. Under any name, a constitutional rule protecting
journalists from compelled disclosure of confidential sources reflects a belief that journalists
play a role in the system of freedom of expression that is distinguishable from the roles of other
speakers. Ignoring the clause that the Constitution itself uses to identify the subset of speakers to
which journalists belong would be perverse.
85. The attorneys general of thirty-four states joined an amicus curiae brief urging the
Supreme Court to reconsider Branzburg. See Brief for States of Oklahoma et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005) (Nos. 04-1507, 041508).
86. McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Arizona, 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Another objection to a constitutional reporter’s privilege is that it is
a one-size-fits-all solution to an issue that has many dimensions.
Sometimes confidential sources shed light on important matters of
public policy, political or business misfeasance, or dangers to public
safety. But they also can be used to circulate trivial gossip, baseless
rumors, or malicious assaults.87 A subpoena sought by a libel plaintiff
seeking to show that the defendant in fact had no source for its
defamatory allegation, or one sought by a criminal defendant seeking to
show that a reporter has information that could exonerate the defendant,
is very different from a subpoena issued by a congressional committee
angered by a network’s criticism of the Pentagon.88 Of course, the
process of deciding whether the information sought is sufficiently
material and necessary to override the privilege will take into account
some of those differences, but not all. In the libel context, a publicfigure plaintiff may have a strong and legitimate argument for the
materiality and necessity of information that might show actual malice.
However, a libel suit can also be a tactical maneuver, the objective of
which is merely to discover a source. The proposed constitutional rule
provides no means of sorting out such cases. Some courts have adopted
rules aimed at prescreening the libel suit to require disclosure only
when the claim appears to have some merit.89 But trying to incorporate
such procedures in a constitutional rule is an unsatisfactory enterprise.
A very different set of problems arises when a criminal defendant seeks
to compel disclosure. In that setting, the standard criteria for defeating
the privilege are themselves inadequate. Whether the information is
critical to the maintenance of the claim is the wrong inquiry; anything
that might plant reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind can be decisive,
regardless of its materiality by civil litigation standards. Again, courts
could develop a specific constitutional rule for information sought by
criminal defendants, but that too makes the matter look less like one
appropriate for constitutional resolution.

87. See Daniel Okrent, The Public Editor: Briefers and Leakers and the Newspapers Who
Enable Them, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at D12 (asserting that “many who cover those twin
cesspools of duplicity, self-regard, and back-stabbing—Hollywood and politics—are addicted to
the practice” of relying on confidential sources).
88. See Corydon B. Dunham, FIGHTING FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT: STANTON OF CBS VS.
CONGRESS AND THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 1–6 (1997) (describing the ultimately unsuccessful
attempt by a congressional committee to hold CBS president Frank Stanton in contempt of
Congress for refusing to provide outtakes of a CBS documentary, The Selling of the Pentagon).
89. See, e.g., Downing v. Monitor Publ’g Co., 415 A.2d 683, 686 (N.H. 1980) (holding
that a libel plaintiff must “satisfy the trial court that he has evidence to establish that there is a
genuine issue of fact regarding the falsity of the publication” before disclosure can be
compelled); Atlanta Journal Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that libel plaintiff must show viability of claim before disclosure can be compelled).
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A. Leak Cases Pose Special Problems
In my view, cases in which the reporter’s testimony is sought in an
attempt to find the source of a government leak also require a
particularized response. The main reason is that they pose a special risk
of official oppression.90 The party trying to find the source of the leak is
often an official whose hackles are up because of the fact of the leak, or
the content of the information leaked, or both. The official is usually a
judge trying to find out who defied the judge’s gag order, a prosecutor
embarrassed that the press has learned something that official
investigators failed to uncover, or an executive official who is put under
pressure or subjected to criticism because of the disclosure. In
Branzburg, both Justice White’s opinion for the Court and Justice
Powell’s concurrence acknowledged this possibility, but the response of
both was only that reporters should not be required to testify in
investigations being conducted in bad faith.91 That is an inadequate
response, because of the well-known reluctance of judges to find that
other public officials are acting in bad faith.92
In other First Amendment contexts, the Court is far more sensitive to
the risk that political pique or retaliation for unfavorable coverage may
be at work, even if it cannot be proved. For example, a tax that treats
some newspapers differently from others is presumptively
unconstitutional because it could potentially be used for censorial
purposes, even when no such purpose is even alleged and the evidence
indicates that the legislature intended no censorship.93 An ordinance that
gives a city official broad discretion to regulate placement of news
90. For a persuasive documentation of the risk—and reality—of arbitrary, discriminatory,
or punitive use of the subpoena power to pursue leakers, see William E. Lee, Deep Background:
Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453 (2008).
91. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693–95, 707–08 (1972); id. at 709–10 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
92. For example, a freelance author writing a book about a criminal defendant was asked
by the government to become an informant for the FBI. See Guillermo X. Garcia, The Vanessa
Leggett Saga, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 2002, at 20, 24. She declined, and the United States
Attorney then subpoenaed the author’s notes of interviews she had with the defendant. See id.
The prosecutor did not follow Justice Department guidelines for subpoenas to journalists on the
ground that the author was not a journalist, and refused to negotiate limits on the material
sought or the uses to which it might be put. See id. at 25. The interviewee had been in police
custody, so there was no apparent reason why the police or the prosecutor’s agents could not
have asked him the same questions the writer asked. Id. A grand jury was able to bring
indictments without benefit of the writer’s testimony. See id. at 21. Nonetheless, a district judge
held the writer in contempt and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the allegation of bad faith
on the ground that the writer had failed to establish that the grand jury bore her malice and
ignoring the circumstances mentioned above. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 29 Med. L. Rptr.
2301 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion). The writer served 168 days in jail. See Garcia,
supra, at 21.
93. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
585–86, 588 (1983).
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racks on public sidewalks is unconstitutional because it creates a risk of
“undetectable censorship.”94 There are similar risks of un-provable
official oppression when government is allowed to compel reporters to
disclose the sources of leaks.
Another constitutional analogy also seems applicable to cases in
which the government seeks to compel disclosure to police leaks by its
own agents. When a government official improperly makes privacyinvading information about a citizen available to the press, the Court
has held that the press cannot be held liable for disclosing the
information.95 This is true even though the agent’s disclosure to the
press was in violation of a statute.96 “Where . . . the government has
failed to police itself in disseminating information, it is clear . . . that the
imposition of damages against the press for its subsequent publication
can hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means of safeguarding
anonymity.”97 Of course, the issue there is whether the press can be
punished for publishing the information furnished to it by the
government agent, not whether it can be punished for refusing to
identify the agent. But if the government’s responsibility to control its
own agents trumps the citizen’s right to redress for injuries suffered
when it fails to do so, the same reasoning casts doubt on the
government’s right to enlist the help of the press in discovering
leakers.98
In these other areas, the Court demonstrates the sensitivity to risks of
unprovable censorship and insists the government control its own
agents instead of shifting that burden to third parties. Those principles
seem to suggest that compelling disclosure to ferret out government
sources who leak to the press ought to be viewed with more skepticism
than subpoenas in other contexts. Perhaps compulsory disclosure for
this purpose ought to be prohibited altogether; maybe courts could
devise ways of identifying cases in which the inference of oppressive
motive is strong enough to preclude enforcement. My purpose here is
not to propose specific solutions for the various types of subpoena
controversies, but to show that they are too diverse to admit any single,
simple, constitutional solution.
94. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 762, 772 (1988).
95. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
96. In Florida Star, a sheriff’s office made a rape victim’s name available to the press
despite a statute that made it a crime to cause or allow such information to be published. Id. at
526–28. The sheriff’s department settled the victim’s civil suit against it for violating the statute.
Id. at 528.
97. Id. at 538.
98. It could be argued that this might leave the government with no effective means of
preventing unauthorized disclosures by its agents, but in the privacy context, the Court was
untroubled by the fact that the government had tried, and failed, to prevent the agent’s
disclosure by criminalizing it. See id. at 540.
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B. Identifying “Reporters”
The most compelling objection to a comprehensive constitutional
solution is the futility of trying to decide as a matter of constitutional
law who should have the right to protect confidential sources. The
majority in Branzburg was concerned that the claims made on behalf of
“reporters” could also be made by “lecturers, political pollsters,
novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists,”99 or anyone else who
contributes to the flow of information to the public. “Sooner or later, it
would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who
qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the
traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely
pamphleteer . . . just as much as of the large metropolitan
publisher . . . .”100 Justice Stewart’s dissent did not address this point; he
said variously that the right would belong to reporters or newsmen.101 A
few years later, Justice Stewart indicated that he viewed the press, for
purposes of the Press Clause, as “the daily newspapers and other
established news media.”102 Presumably, Justice Stewart believed the
reporter’s privilege required by the Press Clause would belong to those
who were employed by such news organizations. Most shield statutes
adopt similar definitions of the beneficiaries of the privilege.103
Today, such a definition is woefully inadequate. Established news
media are disappearing or morphing into forms indistinguishable from
new media that are anything but established. Affording the right to
protect sources only to journalists who work for daily newspapers or
other established news media would deny it to many important news
sources. The broadest suggestions propose to give the privilege to
anyone engaged in gathering or processing information for any public
99. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665, 702–05 (1972).
100. Id. at 704.
101. See generally id. at 728–30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (focusing on confidential
relationship between reporter and informant when gathering news).
102. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 631 (1975).
103. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a) (2009) (defining “newsman” as a “publisher,
editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has
been so connected or employed” or “a radio or television news reporter or other person
connected with or employed by a radio or television station. . . .”); N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-h(b) (2009) (“[P]rofessional journalist or newscaster presently or having previously been
employed or otherwise associated with any newspaper, magazine, news agency, press
association, wire service, radio or television transmission station or network or other
professional medium of communicating news or information to the public. . . .”); FLA. STAT.
§ 90.5015(a) (2009) (“‘Professional journalist’ means a person regularly engaged in collecting,
photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or publishing news, for gain or livelihood,
who obtained the information sought while working as a salaried employee of, or independent
contractor for, a newspaper, news journal, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or
television station, network, or news magazine. . . .”).
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medium of communications,104 but today that could include anyone
with access to a computer or a handheld wireless internet device. The
reality is that distinctions between reporters and the rest of us are
disappearing, but no court will be eager to give most everyone a right to
refuse to testify on the ground of confidentiality.
That does not mean that no one can be given a reporter’s privilege.
Freedom of the press can be served without according the same rights to
everyone who might be considered press. Just as freedom of the press is
served by giving a subset of the press access to the White House, so can
it be served by giving the right to protect confidential sources to a
subset of the press. But attempting to define that subset as a matter of
constitutional law would be foolish. The realities as to who serves the
press function in our society are changing rapidly and dramatically. A
constitutional answer to that question would almost certainly be
obsolete in a few years.
IV. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE
If adoption of a constitutional reporter’s privilege is not the right
solution, neither is it right to deny that compelled disclosure of sources
raises any constitutional issue. However tenable that view may have
been in 1972, much has changed since then. As evidence that requiring
journalists to disclose their sources was widely believed to be consistent
with freedom of the press, Justice White noted that the majority of
states did not have shield statutes;105 today, almost three-fourths do.
Branzburg was a product of pre-Watergate faith in government (the
decision was announced twelve days before the burglary of the
Watergate Hotel). Today, much of Justice White’s opinion for the Court
seems naïve or cavalier. He asserted that compelled disclosure of
sources imposed no restraint
on the type or quality of information reporters may seek to
acquire. . . . [W]e cannot seriously entertain the notion that
the First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to
conceal the criminal conduct of his source, or evidence
thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about crime
than to do something about it.106

104. See, e.g., Dan Paul, Why a Shield Law?, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 459, 461 (1975).
105. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689–90 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 691–92. In a similar vein, Justice White argued,
[W]e cannot accept the argument that the public interest in possible future news
about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources must take precedence over
the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the
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Since then we have seen many instances in which important
information became public only because sources trusted journalists to
keep confidences—from the Watergate scandal107 to the abuses at Abu
Ghraib,108 the existence of secret CIA prisons in Eastern Europe,109 and
the warrantless surveillance of telephone and email communications
between U.S. citizens and persons abroad.110 But it has also become
clear that not all disclosures by confidential sources are of equal
importance.
The best solution to the confidential source problem would be one
that recognizes that compelled disclosure of journalists’ sources can
threaten freedom of the press seriously enough to be unconstitutional,
but leaves the remedy largely to the legislatures or the common law.111

press by informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in the
future.
Id. at 695.
107. The role of the Nixon administration in the burglary was disclosed to the Washington
Post by W. Mark Felt, who for thirty years was identified only as Deep Throat. See Todd S.
Purdum, ‘Deep Throat’ Unmasks Himself: Ex-No.2 at F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at A1.
Mr. Felt, who was the number two official at the FBI at the time of the scandal, identified
himself as the Washington Post’s source in 2005. Id.
108. The abuse of prisoners by guards at this prison in Iraq was exposed when CBS’ 60
Minutes II broadcasted photos taken by the guards themselves and given to CBS by confidential
sources. See Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: How the Department of Defense
Mishandled the Disaster at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, at 38, 39–40.
109. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons-Debate Is Growing
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2005, at A01 (quoting unnamed senior intelligence officials).
110. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1 (quoting unnamed sources to reveal the existence of a
National Security Agency program to wiretap conversations between United States citizens and
persons overseas). One of the newspaper’s sources was eventually revealed to be Thomas M.
Tamm, a Justice Department official who discovered the program and believed it to be illegal.
See Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle; Thomas M. Tamm Was Entrusted with
some of the Government’s Most Important Secrets. He Had a Sensitive Compartmented
Information Security Clearance, a Level Above Top Secret. Government Agents had probed
Tamm’s Background, his Friends and Associates, and Determined him Trustworthy,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 2008, at 40.
111. Larry Sager pointed out long ago that there is nothing unusual about constitutional
norms that are not judicially enforceable. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213–20 (1978)
(discussing application of thesis to identifying such norms in Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence). What I suggest here is slightly different: the norm would be judicially
enforced—by refusing to enforce subpoenas that threaten freedom of the press—but the courts
would not prescribe a constitutional remedy.
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A. Enforcing the Norm Through Legislation
If there is no shield statute, or the statute does not preclude
enforcement of the subpoena, courts should not attempt to fill the gap
by crafting a constitutional reporters’ privilege. The only essential
constitutional question is whether compelling the testimony in the
particular case would abridge freedom of the press. In theory, courts are
not constitutionally required to say anything more than that. In practice,
they give reasons; reasons enable people—in this case, sources and
reporters—to make educated guesses as to how future cases will be
decided. It does not follow, however, that the reasons must themselves
be treated as constitutional rules. The better solution is to identify the
sources of the constitutional problem and let the legislature attempt to
cure it. If the decision is that enforcing the subpoena would violate the
First Amendment for the reason that compulsory disclosure would
never be constitutionally permissible on facts like those at bar, that
reason, of course, is a constitutional rule. If the court believes ordering
disclosure on facts like those at bar could not threaten freedom of the
press, there is no constitutional issue. In cases between those extremes,
the question would be whether the subpoena threatens press freedom
seriously enough to violate the First Amendment. In answering that
question, the court should consider not only the merits of the case at
hand, but also what mechanisms the state provides for protecting press
freedom. Compelling disclosure after the need for the information has
been weighed against the risk to press freedom, in accordance with a
shield statute or a common law privilege, is less likely to threaten
freedom of the press than compelling disclosure when the law has
provided no (or only an inadequate) mechanism to evaluate the need for
the information and the dangers of exposing the source. If the court
believes enforcement of the subpoena in question would be
unconstitutional, it should simply quash the subpoena. That tells the
legislature that similar subpoenas will not be enforceable at least until
the legislature provides a better mechanism for deciding which
subpoenas are enforceable, but does not create a constitutional rule that
forecloses the legislature’s options in deciding how to address the
problem.
B. Enforcing the Norm Through Common Law
In the federal courts and some states, judges have the additional
option of developing a common law response.112 They could craft a
112. Federal courts have undoubted authority to develop common law evidentiary
privileges. See, e.g., Baker v. F&F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d. Cir. 1972). In some states,
courts are denied such authority except through the formal rule-making process for rules of
evidence. See, e.g., TEX. R. EVID. 501 (2009). Even in such states, however, courts sometimes
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comprehensive common law privilege intended to cover all press
subpoena controversies, or they could proceed in the more usual
common law fashion—developing the response incrementally, deciding
in each case only as many details of the privilege as are necessary to
decide the case at hand. As to whether they should try to create in
advance a full-blown common law privilege that will resolve all future
cases, there are considerations pressing in both directions. On one hand,
that is a bad idea for the same reason that a First Amendment privilege
is inadvisable: there are too many disparate kinds of subpoena
controversies to admit a single solution. On the other hand, the
unpredictability of incremental common law development may seem to
counsel against that approach. If the objective is to give sources some
assurance that they can talk to journalists in confidence without fear that
the reporter will be forced to violate the confidence, any uncertainty as
to how much protection the law will provide undermines that objective.
That concern, however, appears to be less convincing in practice
than in theory. Even the most elaborate of the existing reporter’s
privileges—whether First Amendment, statutory, or common law—
contain so many variables that it is rarely possible to have complete
assurance that the confidence cannot be breached. At the time the
source is deciding whether to talk, it is impossible to know the
circumstances in which disclosure may be demanded. Where a
reporter’s privilege exists, it seems to work not so much by providing
firm assurance that the law will not permit the particular confidence to
be breached, but by leading sources to believe that reporters will refuse
to disclose and that anyone seeking to force them to disclose will at
least face some legal impediments. Even if the courts reject the
incremental approach in favor of a comprehensive common law
privilege, that response is still preferable to a constitutional privilege
because it can be more easily modified when that seems desirable.
Because it is only common law, it can be modified by the legislature,
and courts need not accord it the same presumption of immutability that
they would extend to a constitutional rule.
C. Honoring Branzburg
Treating compulsory disclosure of reporters’ confidential sources as
a potential constitutional problem but not imposing a constitutionally
prescribed solution leaves states with a wide range of options. States
can simply abandon the effort to enforce subpoenas of the sort that have
been held unconstitutional, the legislature can address the matter by
create new common law privileges. See, e.g., Hobson v. Moore, 734 S.W.2d 340, 340–41 (Tex.
1987) (recognizing common law privilege, not recognized by rules of evidence, for ongoing law
enforcement investigations).
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statute, or the courts can address it as a matter of common law. This
approach seems consistent with Branzburg.113 The Branzburg Court did
not deny that compelling disclosure could violate the First Amendment;
the majority opinion acknowledged that “news gathering is not without
its First Amendment protections . . . . We do not expect that courts will
forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First
Amendment as well as the Fifth.”114 Justice Powell added, “In short, the
courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances where
legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.”115 The
majority also acknowledged the suitability of more flexible
nonconstitutional responses.116 What the Justices were loathe to do was
create the First Amendment privilege proposed by the reporters in that
case. They were concerned about the details of such a privilege: to
whom it would apply, the circumstances in which it could be defeated,
the burdens that would fall on judges in administering the privilege.117
These concerns convinced the Court that “[t]he administration of a
constitutional newsman’s privilege would present practical and
conceptual difficulties of a high order.”118
If the parties in Branzburg had embraced the approach advocated
here, they would not have urged the Court to adopt a constitutional rule
applicable to all reporters seeking to protect confidential sources.
Instead, they would have argued that the subpoenas in question could
not be enforced because compelling the three reporters to reveal their
sources when the government had in place no mechanism for resolving
conflicts between press freedom and evidentiary needs,119 would violate
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689–91 (1972).
Id. at 707–08.
Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
The majority explained:

At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory
newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and
rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned
and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time
may dictate. There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First
Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and
problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and
press in their own areas.
Id. at 706 (majority opinion).
117. Id. at 704.
118. Id. at 703–04.
119. Under this approach, the Court might well have reached different decisions in the
three cases before it. Two of the reporters had been subpoenaed by federal grand juries, and
federal law gave those reporters no recourse. Id. at 675, 677. The third, Paul Branzburg, was
subpoenaed by a state grand jury in Kentucky, which had a shield statute. Id. at 668. The
Kentucky courts held the statute inapplicable on the ground that Branzburg was an eyewitness

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/9

26

Anderson: Confidential Sources Reconsidered

2009]

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES RECONSIDERED

909

the Press Clause. It is entirely possible, of course, that the Court would
have rejected that proposition too, but the majority seemed open to that
sort of incremental, case-by-case approach.120
The Branzburg opinions have perplexed two generations of lawyers,
judges, scholars, and journalists. The skepticism expressed in some
parts of the majority opinion as to whether press subpoenas impose any
serious burden on press freedom leads some to believe the Court saw no
constitutional problem. But that reading is hard to square with other
aspects of the opinion. Every Justice accepted the idea that freedom of
the press requires some protection for newsgathering, and that
compelling reporters to reveal confidences will deter some sources from
furnishing information.121 The majority stated enigmatically that “grand
juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment,”122 and
Justice Powell asserted that “courts will be available to newsmen under
circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require
protection.”123 These statements are not consistent with the claim that
compelled disclosure of reporters’ confidences raises no constitutional
issue. At the same time, the majority—which included Powell—rejected
the argument that “refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter’s
to crimes, not merely a recipient of information from a confidential source. Id. at 669. It might
be hard to persuade a court that such a limited exception to an otherwise protective shield statute
posed so substantial a threat to press freedom as to violate the Press Clause.
120. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (“At the federal level, Congress has freedom to
determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion
standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and,
equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate. There is
also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own
standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the relations between law
enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of course, that we are
powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing their own
constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.”); see also
id. at 709 (“Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash. We
do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must operate within the limits of the First
Amendment as well as the Fifth.”). In another passage, however, the majority suggested that a
case-by-case approach would not meet the reporters’ claimed need to be able to give assurances
of confidentiality. See id. at 702 n.39.
121. The majority said, “We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or
assembly to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for
First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated.” Id. at 681. The majority also accepted that some sources will
“refuse to talk to newsmen if they fear identification by a reporter in an official investigation.”
Id. at 695. The dissenters thought it obvious that “when neither the reporter nor his source can
rely on the shield of confidentiality against unrestrained use of the grand jury’s subpoena power,
valuable information will not be published and the public dialogue will inevitably be
impoverished.” Id. at 736 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 708 (majority opinion).
123. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
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privilege will undermine the freedom of the press to collect and
disseminate news.”124 If we understand the majority as being
sympathetic with the end but leery of the means, these positions are
reconcilable. After surveying the numerous details that would have to
be resolved in administering the constitutional privilege sought by the
reporters, the majority said, “We are unwilling to embark the judiciary
on a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination.”125 The
solution proposed here spares the courts that difficulty. It accounts for
the views of all the members of the Branzburg majority. Most
importantly, it recognizes that confidential source problems may have
constitutional dimensions, but it avoids constitutionalizing the entire
subject.

124. Id. at 698–99 (majority opinion).
125. Id. at 703.
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